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This article analyses critically the 2018 Christchurch Employment Relations 
Authority’s (the Authority) decision in Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford v 
Casino Bar Limited, which found that two strip dancers were independent 
contractors as opposed to employees. The article argues that this decision weakens 
sex workers’ employment rights. It contends, therefore, that the Authority’s 
decision diverges from the protective aims of the Prostitution Reform Act 2003. In 
addition, in relation to employment law more broadly, the article argues that the 




In 2017, 14 years after the Prostitution Reform Act 2003 legalised sex 
work in New Zealand, exotic dancers Tineill Hamilton-Redmond and Jessica 
Clifford failed to appear for their scheduled shifts at the Christchurch adult 
entertainment venue Calendar Girls. As a consequence of their absence, 
Calendar Girls management removed Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford from 
shift rosters, effectively terminating their employment. As a preliminary step to 
raising a personal grievance against Calendar Girls, the two women appeared 
before the Christchurch Employment Relations Authority (the Authority) in 
August 2018 to determine their employment status with Calendar Girls.1 In 
a decision by member David Appleton, the Authority found that the women 
were independent contractors and not employees of Calendar Girls under 
s 6(1)(a) of the Employment Relations Act 2000. Consequently, Hamilton-
Redmond and Clifford could not establish a personal grievance claim against 
Calendar Girls.
1 Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford v Casino Bar Limited (Christchurch) [2018] NZERA 1128.
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This article seeks to analyse critically the Authority’s reasoning in finding 
that Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford were independent contractors and 
identify potential implications for sex workers’ employment rights and 
employment law more broadly. To do this, this article consists of three main 
sections. Section II outlines the facts surrounding Hamilton-Redmond and 
Clifford and the Authority’s findings. Section III discusses the application 
of the common law tests used for determining the “real nature” of an 
employment relationship in the unusual context of the work relationship 
between the claimants and Calendar Girls. Section IV critically assesses some 
of the potential implications of this decision on the employment rights of sex 
workers in connection with the Prostitution Reform Act 2003. It addresses 
the disconnect that exists between the aim of the Prostitution Reform 
Act 2003 to protect sex workers’ employment rights and the vulnerability 
of independent contractors under New Zealand employment law. More 
broadly, in relation to employment law, it argues that the Authority’s decision 
reinforces the vulnerability experienced by workers in precarious employment. 
The 2018 decision in Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford raises challenges for 
employment law in New Zealand and its effects deserve further scrutiny. 
II. Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford: Facts and  
the Authority’s Finding  
In late 2017, both Tineill Hamilton-Redmond and Jessica Clifford were 
working as exotic dancers (also known as strippers or lap dancers) at the 
Christchurch adult entertainment venue Calendar Girls. In September 2017, 
after threats and an attempted burglary of their shared flat, the women went 
to the police to file a complaint.2 As a result, both dancers were absent from 
one night’s rostered work at Calendar Girls.3 Calendar Girls management 
fined Ms Clifford for her absence and later told her that she was “fired”.4 
Calendar Girls management removed Ms Hamilton-Redmond from the shift 
roster in November 2017 without informing her of its decision not to offer 
further work to her.5 The claimants’ lawyer corresponded with Calendar 
Girls in December 2017 regarding the end of the women’s employment, 
but was informed that exotic dancers at Calendar Girls were independent 
contractors and not employees.6 As a consequence, Hamilton-Redmond and 
Clifford could not bring a personal grievance claim against Calendar Girls in 
respect of their dismissal through the Employment Relations Authority.7 In 
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and Clifford sought a determination of their employment status before the 
Employment Relations Authority in August 2018. 
In determining whether Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford were employees, 
the Authority referred to s 6(1)(a) of the Employment Relations Act 2000, 
which states that: “... employee ... means any person of any age employed by 
an employer to do any work for hire or reward under a contract of service”. To 
determine whether an individual is an employee, ss 6(2) and (3) provide that 
the Court must consider the real nature of the work relationship, including 
all relevant factors.8 The leading case for determining the real nature of the 
relationship is Bryson v Three Foot Six Ltd (No 2),9 where the Supreme Court 
identified a number of relevant matters that should be considered when 
determining the real nature of the relationship. These include the written 
and oral terms of the contract, how the contract operates in practice, and 
the control, integration, and economic reality (fundamental) tests.10 If an 
individual is found not to be an employee, they may instead be an independent 
contractor. The determination of the employment status is important because 
independent contractors lack many of the relevant employment rights granted 
under the Employment Relations Act 2000, including the ability to raise 
personal grievances against their employers.
In Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford, the Authority identified factors that 
both favoured and spoke against the existence of an employment relationship. 
However, on balance, it determined that Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford 
were independent contractors.11 Although an assessment of the real nature of 
the relationship required the Authority to consider many different aspects of 
Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford’s work, the conclusion of the Authority’s 
judgment identifies two factors as being particularly significant. Firstly, the 
dancers at Calendar Girls did not receive a regular income from their position 
as dancers. Unless the dancers received tips from customers or sold additional 
services, such as lap dances, the dancers would not earn any money for their 
efforts.12 This means that the dancers were their own “product”.13 Secondly, 
the Authority found that industry practice favoured the finding that the 
claimants were independent contractors.14 It therefore concluded that, 
according to the tests set out in s 6(1)(a) of the Employment Relations Act 
2000 and Bryson v Three Foot Six Ltd (No 2), the real nature of the relationship 
8 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 6(2) and s 6(3).
9 Bryson v Three Foot Six Ltd (No 2) [2005] 3 NZLR 721. Note that while the decision in Bryson 
has now been rendered largely inoperable on its facts following the passage of the “Hobbit 
Law”, its discussion of the common law tests for determining employment status remain 
valid.
10 At [32]. The control test and the integration test will be examined in greater detail in Section 
III of this article.
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between Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford and Calendar Girls was that of an 
independent contractor and not an employee relationship.
This article focusses specifically on the Authority’s application of two of 
the common-law tests used to determine the real nature of a relationship 
referred to in Bryson v Three Foot Six Limited (No 2), namely the control and 
integration tests. It will evaluate the Authority’s application of these tests to 
the context of Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford’s work with Calendar Girls.
III. The Authority’s Application of the Control and 
Integration Tests
A. The Authority’s Application of the Control Test 
The Court of Appeal considered the control test in the leading case of 
TNT Worldwide Express NZ Ltd v Cunningham.15 The control test emphasises 
the degree of control exercised by the alleged employer over the alleged 
employee.16 It assumes that employees are subject to more stringent control 
than contractors. Aspects of control considered in applying this test include 
control over the hours of work, the processes used at work, and the location 
of work, amongst other factors.17 Accordingly, in Hamilton-Redmond and 
Clifford, the Authority identified several kinds of control as being relevant 
for this test, including control over health and safety issues, control over the 
dancers’ physical appearance, control over the dancers’ behaviour through a 
system of fines and control over the dancers’ work through a restraint of trade 
agreement.18 Additionally, it considered the control exercised by the dancers 
over their work, such as their ability to refuse to provide additional services to 
customers, their ability to choose their own shifts and their ability to refuse 
to attend staff meetings.19
The Authority considered that some kinds of control were neutral, 
pointing neither towards an employment relationship nor an independent 
contractor relationship. Health and safety rules, such as the prohibitions 
on dancers’ drunkenness and drug-taking, sexual or romantic relationships 
with staff members and theft,20 were considered by the Authority to be 
common to both employment and independent contractor relationships.21 
Consequently, the presence of such rules did not favour either the existence 
of an employment relationship or an independent contractor relationship.22 
15 TNT Worldwide Express NZ Ltd v Cunningham [1993] 3 NZLR 881 (CA). 
16 Ibid.
17  Ibid.




22 At [93]. 
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Likewise, the Authority found that the restraint of trade placed on the 
dancers was not unique to employment relationships and could also be found 
in independent contractor relationships.23 The Authority also considered the 
strict control exercised over the dancers’ appearance. Dancers were required 
to wear matching lingerie and “immaculate” makeup.24 Although this high 
degree of control might be seen to favour the existence of an employment 
relationship, the Authority again found that this kind of control was 
“neutral”, favouring neither the existence of an employment relationship 
nor an independent contractor relationship.25 It found that this control over 
appearance was mutually beneficial for Calendar Girls and the dancers, 
ensuring that Calendar Girls’ brand was protected and providing guidance 
for newer and inexperienced dancers to help them maximise their profits.26 
This mutual benefit led the Authority to conclude that this degree of control 
was neutral.27
Although the Authority considered some kinds of control as neutral, 
it found that others favoured the existence of an independent contractor 
relationship. The policies document provided by Calendar Girls allowed for 
a system of fines for dancers’ misbehaviour. Fines ranged from $50 to $500 
for behaviour varying from inappropriate dress to appearing intoxicated.28 
In considering the role of the fining system, the Authority commented that 
this system clearly privileged the existence of an independent contractor 
relationship as such a system would be: “highly problematic and highly 
unusual in an employment relationship”.29 Although the Authority noted that 
the claimants’ representative had suggested that the fines were unlawful, it 
considered this irrelevant in determining the real nature of the relationship.30 
Since fines were “highly problematic” in an employment relationship, the 
existence of the fining system supported a finding that the claimants were 
independent contractors. The Authority likewise concluded that the dancers’ 
control over some aspects of their employment backed the finding of an 
independent contractor relationship. The Authority found that dancers could 
refuse to provide additional services, such as lap dances, to customers who 
requested them,31 could choose when to work,32 and were not punished for 
failing to attend staff meetings.33 Although the Authority does not explicitly 
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test, it seemingly uses these factors to support a finding that the claimants 
were independent contractors. 
While it is likely that the Authority’s findings in respect of the controls 
exercised over health and safety and restraint of trade were correct, its 
application of the control test to other aspects of control can be criticised. 
In particular, the Authority’s consideration of the control over the dancers’ 
appearance, the use of fines and the dancers’ ability to refuse to provide 
additional services can be challenged.
Firstly, when finding that the control exercised by Calendar Girls over 
the dancers’ appearance was “neutral”, the Authority emphasised the mutual 
benefit of the control exercised by Calendar Girls. However, the emphasis on 
mutual benefit for the control test is incorrect. The control test simply seeks 
to determine the degree of control exercised over a worker, not the benefit 
of this control for the worker.34 Considering whether or not a worker has 
benefited from control over their work is subjective and difficult to determine. 
For example, it could be argued that while fixed hours create stability for 
workers, this also reduces their flexibility. For this reason, the control test 
simply focusses on the objectively observable degree of control, rather than 
the subjective merits of this control. Additionally, it is patronising to imply 
that Calendar Girls’ strict control over dancers’ appearance was for the 
dancers’ own benefit as independent contractors. As the name indicates, 
independent contractors are independent persons, independent from the 
business which contracted them. It is reductive and affronting to imply that 
the limits imposed on such people on the way they conduct their business is 
for their personal advantage. The Authority’s appreciation of mutual benefit 
in considering Calendar Girls’ control over the dancers’ appearance is not 
only incorrect but demeaning and paternalistic.35 Such interpretation runs 
contrary to the spirit of the Prostitution Reform Act 2003, which aims to 
make sex work equivalent to any other legitimate business.
Secondly, the Authority’s emphasis on the existence of fines as supporting 
an independent contractor relationship is also incorrect. The Authority 
highlighted the mere existence of the fines as favouring the existence of 
an independent contractor relationship and refused to consider the actual 
lawfulness of such fines. In this way, the Authority precluded the possibility 
that the real nature of the relationship was an employment relationship, with 
fines being used in an unlawful way. The failure to consider that the fine 
might possibly be unlawful precluded a true consideration of the real nature 
of the relationship between Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford with Calendar 
Girls. 
Finally, the Authority’s emphasis on the dancers’ ability to refuse to provide 
additional services to customers as supporting the existence of an independent 
34 TNT Worldwide Express NZ Ltd, above n 15; Curlew v Harvey Norman Stores (NZ) Pty Ltd 
[2002] 1 ERNZ 114; Koia v Carlyon Holdings Ltd [2001] ERNZ 585.
35 See further on this in Section IV.
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contractor relationship is misguided. The Authority implicitly suggested that 
the dancers’ ability to refuse to provide lap dances or other additional services 
to clients backed a finding that the dancers were independent contractors. 
It underscored that the dancers’ ability to refuse to provide such services 
distinguished them from other workers in areas such as retail, traditionally 
considered to be employees, who could not refuse clients.36 Consequently, 
the dancers were considered to be independent contractors under the control 
test. However, focusing on the dancers’ ability to refuse to provide additional 
services ignores the realities of such dancers’ specific work. Firstly, dancers 
were not permitted to refuse to perform their basic role of dancing and 
stripping. The policies document on the code of conduct for dancers drafted 
by Calendar Girls included a fine for wearing a G-string after the conclusion 
of dancing, breaching the dancers’ obligation to dance and remove their 
clothing.37 The dancers’ ability to refuse to perform existed only in respect 
of additional services which customers could request. The dancers’ basic role 
of dancing and stripping remained compulsory. Secondly, legislation means 
that even if Calendar Girls had exercised power over the dancers by forcing 
them to perform additional sexual services, such act would likely be illegal. 
Section 17 of the Prostitution Reform Act 2003 states that workers providing 
commercial sexual services may refuse to provide such services at any time, 
even if a contract for such services exists. The focus on the dancers’ control 
over the additional services that they may provide ignores the realities of the 
nature of the dancers’ work. 
In applying the control test, the Authority takes an abstract and artificial 
approach to considering many of the kinds of control exerted by Calendar 
Girls over the dancers. It does not arguably consider the real nature of 
the relationship and, instead, it concentrates on the surface appearance of 
freedom experienced by the dancers at Calendar Girls. 
B. Authority’s Application of the Integration Test
In addition to the control test and, as established in Bryson v Three Foot Six 
Ltd (No. 2),38 relevant matters to be considered to determine the real nature 
of the relationship include an assessment of the integration test.39 Under that 
test, workers are considered to be employees if they are “integrated” into 
the business for which they work. This test, discussed in decisions such as 
Challenge Realty Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue40 and Telecom South 
Ltd v Post Office Union (Inc),41 emphasises whether the individual is “part and 
parcel” of the business. It assumes that, while an employee is employed as part 
36 Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford, above n 1, at [103].
37 At [14].
38 Bryson v Three Foot Six Ltd (No. 2), above n 9.
39 At [32].
40 Challenge Realty Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1990] 3 NZLR 42.
41 Telecom South Ltd v Post Office Union (Inc) [1992] 1 NZLR 275.
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of the business and the work is done as an integral part of the business, an 
independent contractor is only an accessory to the business. The test considers 
whether the worker forms a part of a bigger business, or whether the worker is 
genuinely in business on his or her own account. The integration test focusses 
on the contribution to a greater cause and involvement in a brand stretching 
beyond the worker’s own individual work. In reality, this test is an extension 
of the control test beyond the way the work is carried out to the day-to-day 
management of the business. As such, it does not add much to the control 
test in the difficult borderline cases. The kinds of question assessed under the 
integration test include whether the worker attends staff meetings; whether 
they wear the same uniform as others; and whether they have to follow 
systems like everyone else, such as clocking in or filling in-house forms.42 
This test recognises that while both employees and independent contractors 
work for a business, only employees are an integral part of the business of the 
employer.
In Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford, the integration test is assessed through 
the issue of branding. In its decision the Authority dedicated significant 
discussion to considering whether the applicants furthered the Calendar 
Girls’ brand or whether the Calendar Girls venue simply provided a space 
for the claimants to market their own personal brands of sexual services. 
The Authority found that if the dancers furthered the Calendar Girls’ brand 
of sexual services, they were arguably integrated in the Calendar Girls’ 
brand and would likely be employees under the integration test. Furthering 
the Calendar Girls’ brand, the dancers would clearly be “part and parcel” 
of Calendar Girls’ business. In contrast, if Calendar Girls were simply an 
“umbrella” venue, providing a safe venue for sex workers to gather and sell 
their individual “brands” of sexual services, then the applicants would likely 
not be integrated into the Calendar Girls’ brand and would therefore likely be 
considered independent contractors under the integration test. If the dancers 
were simply using the Calendar Girls venue to market their own individual 
brands, the dancers would be in business on their own account and would not 
be contributing towards the Calendar Girls’ brand. 
Applying the integration test to the facts, the Authority agreed with the 
respondent’s assertion that Calendar Girls simply provided a venue for dancers 
such as Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford to promote their own individual 
brands of sexual services. The dancers were consequently not considered to be 
integrated into the Calendar Girls’ brand. Although the Authority agreed that 
the dancers were clearly integral to Calendar Girls, the role of the dancers’ 
own brands meant that the dancers were not integrated into the Calendar 
Girls’ brand.
Branding was assessed by the Authority through two factors: the lack 
of uniform for dancers and the role of dancers’ individual characteristics in 
attracting customers. The Authority emphasised that dancers at Calendar 
42 Ibid.
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Girls provided their own clothing and did not wear branded merchandise.43 
In contrast, the Authority noted that other staff, such as those tasked with 
promoting Calendar Girls, wore branded clothing.44 Additionally, the 
Authority found that it was the individual characteristics of dancers which 
attracted customers, meaning that each dancer was furthering her own 
brand.45 The Authority held in particular that:46 
It is clear that the dancers are selling themselves, rather 
than a Calendar Girls product of service, in the sense that 
they are using their choreographic skills and inherent 
sensuality to attract tips and the purchase of private lap 
dances and penthouse sessions. Every dancer has her own 
set of unique charms which will attract some customers 
and not others. This is the nature of entertainment and is 
quite unlike a shop assistant, or a member of restaurant 
waiting staff, whose job is to sell the goods or services of 
their employer.
As the dancers did not receive a salary, their income was dependent on 
the tips they received from their dancing and the sale of additional services 
(such as lap dances). According to the Authority, this marked dancers 
as distinctively different from other kinds of worker in more traditional 
employment positions.
The Authority’s approach to merchandising takes arguably an incorrectly 
narrow approach to considering the Calendar Girls’ “brand”. Firstly, it is hard 
to imagine how, in any circumstances, the dancers could wear clothing to 
promote the Calendar Girls’ brand. The dancers were expected to end their 
dancing nude and to collect tips in the nude.47 The dancers’ role required 
them to wear little clothing, meaning that the focus on the role of branded 
merchandise for the integration test is meaningless. In any case, it can be 
argued that whether nude or wearing lingerie, the dancers’ appearance 
associated them with the Calendar Girls’ brand as the logo of Calendar Girls 
includes a silhouette of a nude woman in heels.48 Additionally, when not 
nude, the policy document produced by Calendar Girls required dancers to 
wear matching lingerie, which “[implies] sexiness and sensuality”.49 In the 
judgment, the Authority commented that this rule was designed to protect the 
Calendar Girls’ brand of sensuality.50 Whether naked or dressed in matching 





48 This can be clearly seen on the venue’s exterior in Christchurch.
49 Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford, above n 1, at [13].
50 At [95].
100 Canterbury Law Review [Vol 24, 2018]
lingerie, the absence of the words “Calendar Girls” from the dancers’ clothing 
cannot lead to the conclusion that the dancers were simply promoting their 
own personal brands.
Additionally, the significant distinction that the Authority drew between 
the dancers and other services is overstated. The Authority distinguished 
dancers from other workers by arguing that each dancer received income 
on the basis of her own unique charms, in contrast to other workers which 
simply provide the services of their employer. However, while each dancer 
may use her unique skills to attract tips from some customers and not from 
others, all dancers are selling the same “product” of sexual gratification. 
Although the Authority suggests that each dancer is offering a unique 
“product”, the ultimately identical product of sexual gratification arguably 
creates some similarities between exotic dancing and other positions where 
a customer may prefer a particular individual to perform a specific service. 
An example could be a service provided by personal trainers. While personal 
trainers employed by a fitness centre all seek to provide fitness services, each 
trainer has his or her own unique personality that will attract some customers 
and not others. Customers may prefer a male or female trainer and may prefer 
some kinds of personalities over others. However, all personal trainers provide 
the same core product of fitness services. Other examples include beauticians 
or hairdressers. Likewise, while all dancers are selling a slightly different form 
of sexual gratification, all the services provided by the dancers are essentially 
the same. Although the Authority drew a strict distinction between the 
dancers’ individual sales and the Calendar Girls’ brand on the grounds that 
each dancer sold individual products, the goal of each dancer in selling sexual 
gratification calls into question this strict distinction.
Like the Authority’s application of the control test, its application of the 
integration test is artificial and ignores the realities of the dancers’ work. The 
Authority’s reliance on the wearing of merchandised clothing and the role 
of individual characteristics in selling goods was incorrect. The Authority’s 
application of the integration test failed to evaluate the real nature of the 
relationship between Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford with Calendar Girls.
IV. Implications of Hamilton-Redmond and CliffoRd
Having outlined the Authority’s findings and reasoning in respect of 
Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford’s employment status as independent 
contractors of Calendar Girls, this article will now discuss some implications 
of this decision. As an Employment Relations Authority case, the Hamilton-
Redmond and Clifford decision has, arguably, limited value as a legal precedent. 
The legal doctrine of precedent normally only starts at the Employment 
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Court level and above.51 Nevertheless, the Authority’s decision has at the 
very least “persuasive relevance” in terms of any subsequent case with similar 
facts. The decision has, in any case, been appealed to the Employment Court. 
In addition, since the areas of law addressed in the Hamilton-Redmond and 
Clifford decision are rarely brought forward to higher courts, whether in New 
Zealand or abroad, the impact of the decision is potentially far-reaching. 
This article will focus on two key implications. It will firstly discuss the 
contribution of this decision to the law surrounding sex workers’ employment 
rights, including the Prostitution Reform Act 2003. It will secondly discuss 
how this decision demonstrates the vulnerability experienced by workers in 
precarious employment agreements. The implications of this decision are 
significant both for sex workers’ employment rights and employment law 
more broadly.
A. Effect of Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford on the Legislative Regime for 
Sex Workers’ Employment Rights
The Prostitution Reform Act (PRA) was adopted in 2003, decriminalising 
prostitution in New Zealand and granting sex workers a number of new 
employment law protections. While the Act contains a number of provisions 
relating to criminal and health matters,52 the Act also has a strong focus on 
upholding the employment law rights of sex workers. Section 3 of the PRA 
lists a number of purposes of the Act, including creating: 
… a framework that – 
(a) safeguards the human rights of sex workers and pro-
tects them from exploitation: 
(b) promotes the welfare and occupational health and 
safety of sex workers: 
(c) is conducive to public health: 
(d) prohibits the use in prostitution of persons under 18 
years of age: 
(e) implements certain other related reforms. 
51 Gordon Anderson and others Mazengarb’s Employment Law New Zealand 2018 (online loose-
leaf ed, LexisNexisNZ, accessed 1 December 2018), commentary on s 186 Employment 
Relations Act 2000. 
52 For example, ss 8–10 that regulate the use of condoms and other mechanisms to reduce the 
transmission of sexually-transmitted infections and ss 20–23 that prohibit the use of minors 
in prostitution.
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The PRA occurred in response to concerns about the exploitation of sex 
workers’ health53 as well as their employment rights.54 Although historically 
the Massage Parlours Act 1978 regulated where indoor sex work could take 
place, it did not address the protection of sex workers’ employment rights.55 
This meant that while sex workers were employed by brothel owners, they 
had few employment law rights that they could seek to enforce.56 The PRA 
departed from this historical precedent by providing new recognition and 
support for sex workers’ employment rights.
The PRA has generally been acknowledged to have a positive practical effect 
in granting greater recognition to sex workers’ employment law rights in New 
Zealand.57 Lynzi Armstrong, in particular, has argued that sex workers have 
gained increasing flexibility in their employment since the introduction of 
the PRA.58 She also suggests that sex workers’ awareness of their employment 
rights has increased significantly since 2003, with sex workers empowered 
and better able to assert their rights.59 Today, New Zealand is held up by 
many sex work advocates as an example of a sex worker positive legislative 
model.60
Judicial decisions on sex workers’ employment rights have sought to uphold 
the policy goals of this legislative framework. In the 2014 decision of DML 
v Montgomery, the Human Rights Tribunal granted damages to a sex worker 
who complained of sexual harassment at work.61 The claimant alleged that 
the respondent, her brothel manager, had continually harassed her through 
asking a number of questions of a sexual nature. Throughout its decision, 
the Human Rights Review Tribunal affirmed the importance of sex workers’ 
employment rights. While the respondent argued that questions of a sexual 
nature were de rigeur in a brothel, the Human Rights Review Tribunal found 
53 See Gillian Abel, Lisa Fitzgerald and Catherine Healy (eds) Taking the Crime Out of Sex Work: 
New Zealand Sex Workers’ Fight for Decriminalisation (Policy Press, Bristol, 2010); Laura 
Meriluoto and others “Safety in the New Zealand Sex Industry” (2014) 49 New Zealand 
Economic Papers 296; and Gillian Abel “Sex Workers’ Utilisation of Health Services in a 
Decriminalised Environment” (2014) 127 New Zealand Medical Journal.
54 See Gillian Abel “Sex Work Is Here to Stay and Decriminalisation Improves Safety and 
Social Justice” (2018) British Medical Journal 361.
55 Joanna Schmidt “The Regulation of Sex Work in Aotearoa/NewZealand: An Overview” 
(2017) 31 Women’s Studies Journal 35 at 40.
56  At 44.
57 See Gillian Abel “In Search of a Fair and Free Society: The Regulation of Sex Work in New 
Zealand” in E Ward and G Wylie (eds) Feminism, Prostitution and the State: The Politics of 
Neo-Abolitionism (Routledge, Abingdon, UK, 2017) 140.
58 Lynzi Armstrong “Out of the Shadows (and Into a Bit of Light): Decriminalization, Human 
Rights and Street-Based Sex Work in New Zealand” in Kate Hardy, Sarah Kingston and 
Teela Sanders (eds) New Sociologies of Sex Work (Ashgate Publishing, Farnham, UK, 2010) 39 
at 41.
59 At 42.
60 Gillian Abel “A Decade of Decriminalization: Sex Work ‘Down Under’ but not Underground” 
(2014) 14 Criminology and Criminal Justice 580.
61 DML v Montgomery [2014] NZHRRT 6.
In the Nude: Factors Determining the Employment Status of Sex Workers 103
that sexual language did not always have a business purpose in a brothel and 
that sexual harassment could occur.62 The Tribunal commented that failing 
to recognise that sexual harassment could occur in a brothel would deprive 
sex workers’ of their rights under the Human Rights Act 1993.63 Additionally, 
the decision explicitly acknowledged that sex workers were entitled to the 
same protections against sexual harassment as other workers and identified 
that a policy goal of the PRA was to protect sex workers’ employment rights.64 
The Tribunal concluded by identifying the vulnerability of sex workers and 
emphasising the need to uphold sex workers’ rights.65 DML v Montgomery 
is an example of a judicial body taking a rights-affirming approach to the 
employment rights of sex workers recognised in the PRA.
A number of decisions in New Zealand, as well as in Australia and 
South Africa, had previously upheld the employment rights of those in the 
adult entertainment industry. These cases demonstrate that there has been 
a move towards recognising that sex workers are in an employee-employer 
relationship. As a result of these decisions, the Courts have recognised and 
applied the relevant employment rights to such workers.
In the Australian decisions of Phillipa v Carmel,66 for example, the 
applicant was engaged to provide sexual services for men by the respondent, 
the madam of a brothel in Kalgoorlie, Western Australia. The respondent 
terminated the applicant’s contract in November 1995 resulting in the 
applicant claiming compensation for unfair dismissal under the Industrial 
Relations Act 1988 (Australia). The judicial registrar determined that the 
respondent had sufficient control over the applicant to establish an employee-
employer relationship. Similarly, the Labour Appeals Court of South Africa 
in ‘Kylie’ v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration67 held 
that the right to fair labour practices exists for everyone, even if no formal 
contract of employment is concluded and even if the work is illegal. As a 
result, the sex worker who alleged that she had been unfairly terminated from 
her employment in a massage parlour could pursue her claim through the 
court system as she was to be considered as an employee for the purposes 
of the Labour Relations Act 1995 and the South African Constitution. In 
addition, a series of New Zealand decisions, none of which were cited in 
Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford, have recognised that brothel managers in 





66 Phillipa v Carmel (1996) AIRC Print 960433 433/96, 10 September 1996.
67 ‘Kylie’ v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (2010) 31 ILJ 1600 (LAC).
68 See Le Prou v Tauripi Tavern (1996) Ltd (ERA Christchurch CA 118A/04, 27); Francis v 
Avalon Businesses Ltd (ERA Auckland AA 340/07, 30 October 2007) and Richards-Rattray v 
Willbank (ERA Wellington WA 11/01, 26 March 2001). 
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these decisions demonstrate that the Courts are willing to uphold sex workers’ 
employment rights.
However, Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford calls into question the Courts’ 
true willingness to uphold sex workers’ employment rights. In contrast 
to other decisions, Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford cannot be viewed as 
successful in upholding sex workers’ employment rights. Failure to find 
Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford to be employees of Calendar Girls deprived 
the claimants of basic employment right protections, including holiday pay 
and sick leave, as well as the ability to raise a personal grievance against their 
employers. As independent contractors, Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford 
were unable to challenge the abrupt end to their employment at Calendar 
Girls. Additionally, as independent contractors while they were working at 
Calendar Girls, they would have had no recourse against the use of fines 
and other practices at Calendar Girls. This failure to protect the claimants’ 
basic employment rights is arguably inconsistent with the PRA, which was 
designed to protect sex workers against exploitative practices. The decision 
of Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford suggests that protection for sex workers’ 
employment rights may not be as secure as may have been believed to be 
before this decision.
Moreover, the industry practice identified in Hamilton-Redmond and 
Clifford may suggest that, despite the existence of the PRA and several 
previous supportive judicial decisions, sex workers’ employment rights are not 
consistently upheld in the adult entertainment industry. A significant part of 
the Authority’s decision is dedicated to considering industry practice.69 The 
respondent produced a number of employment agreements from other adult 
entertainment employers to show that sex workers are usually considered to 
be independent contractors within the industry.70 These agreements also show 
that sex workers are typically subject to significant control from management. 
Fines for misbehaviour were commonplace.71 Other documents provided 
that sex workers were not compensated for promotional work72 and were 
not entitled to sick or holiday leave although required to provide notice for 
absences.73 In one agreement, sex workers were required to pay $40 shift fees 
and $40 advertising fees weekly.74 These agreements present a bleak picture of 
sex workers’ employment in New Zealand, suggesting that such workers are 
routinely subjected to stringent control over their work routines, even while 
being described as contractors. 
Additionally, the industry practice outlined in Hamilton-Redmond and 
Clifford is consistent with some other studies. Michael Roguski’s 2013 study for 
the New Zealand Prostitutes Collective found that 72 per cent of sex workers 
69 See Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford, above n 1, at [18]–[42].
70 At [25], [32] and [39].
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participating in the study did not have a written employment agreement with 
their employer.75 Catherine Zangger’s 2016 thesis commented that: “Despite 
sex workers being in favour of the legal change, and evidence of improvements 
in management practices, according to the sex workers I interviewed, unfair 
practices still persist.”76 Moreover, many of the practices she identifies as 
being common prior to the PRA, such as “arbitrary and unfair work rules”, 
and fines and unfair dismissal,77 can still be seen in the industry practice 
provided by the respondent in Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford. Despite 
the existence of the PRA and a number of decisions that have affirmed sex 
workers’ employment rights, it seems likely that sex workers’ employment 
rights are upheld inconsistently in the adult entertainment industry. 
B. Vulnerability of precarious employment 
In addition to its implications for sex workers’ employment rights, the 
Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford decision has significant implications for 
employment law more generally. Over the last 20 years, increasing focus 
has been placed on the rise of the so-called “precariat”. Such workers are in 
employment situations without what Guy Standing terms the seven securities: 
labour market security, employment security, job security, work security, skill 
reproduction security, income security and representation security.78 Standing 
estimates that in many developed countries up to a quarter of adults represent 
this precariat.79 The precariat is characterised by a level of vulnerability and a 
lack of basic employment rights.
Although the rise of the precariat manifests itself in many different 
ways, the increase in independent contractors, such as Hamilton-Redmond 
and Clifford, and their exclusion from employment law protections is an 
example of this phenomenon. While there is no official data, Statistics New 
Zealand has acknowledged that the number of contractors in New Zealand 
has likely grown since the 1980s.80 Since contractors are considered to be 
professionals who are capable of being in business on their own account, they 
do not receive many of the basic protections of the Employment Relations 
Act 2000. However, while traditionally contractor relationships may have 
helped independent business people exercise their contractual freedom, there 
75 Michael Roguski Occupational Health and Safety of Migrant Sex Workers in New Zealand 
(Kaitiaki Research and Evaluation, Wellington, 28 March 2013) at 46.
76 Catherine Zangger “For Better or Worse? Decriminalisation, Work Conditions, and Indoor 
Sex Work in Auckland, New Zealand/Aotearoa” (PhD Dissertation, University of British 
Columbia, December 2015) at 123.
77 At 123.
78 Guy Standing The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class (Bloomsbury Publishing, London, 
2014) at 17.
79 At 41.
80 Statistics New Zealand Flexibility and Security in Employment: Findings from the 2012 Survey 
of Working Life (19 March 2014) at 9. 
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is evidence that contractor agreements are increasingly being used to avoid 
granting employees basic employment rights. A recent example occurred in 
August 2018, when a taxi company was ordered to pay drivers lost wages as 
compensation for their use of contractor agreements to avoid entitlements to 
holiday pay and other employment rights.81 While the Authority in Hamilton-
Redmond and Clifford found that the use of contractor agreements on those 
facts was not to avoid legal responsibility,82 the Authority identified that finding 
the claimants to be contractors increased their vulnerability.83 However, the 
Authority commented that it was bound by the narrow dichotomy between 
contractors and employees and, as the claimants could not be recognised as 
employees, their employment status was more akin to contractors. Hamilton-
Redmond and Clifford demonstrates that, even if contractor agreements are 
not being used to ignore employment rights, the very finding that a worker is 
a contractor creates vulnerability from a legal perspective. The vulnerability 
of individuals such as Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford, who work under the 
control of a single manager or organisation and who do not benefit from the 
flexibility and freedom typically associated with independent contractors, is 
being increasingly identified as a concern and deserves further scrutiny.
V. Conclusion  
The Christchurch Employment Relation Authority’s finding in Hamilton-
Redmond and Clifford that two exotic dancers at the adult entertainment 
venue Calendar Girls were independent contractors, and not employees, raises 
a number of essential legal issues for employment law in general and for sex 
workers in particular. This article has discussed the Authority’s finding and 
some of its reasoning with regards to the determination of the employment 
status of sex workers. It has challenged the Authority’s application of the 
control and integration tests to the facts of the decision. Additionally, this 
article has outlined the potential implications of this decision for sex workers’ 
employment law rights and the growing vulnerability of workers in precarious 
employment. The significant issues raised by the Hamilton-Redmond and 
Clifford decision highlights the need for further research in this area in order 
to clarify the potential implications of this decision and answer the policy 
issues raised by this decision. Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford have appealed 
the decision of the Authority and, in the light of the above discussion, it will 
be interesting to see if the Employment Court considers the wider impact of 
determining the employment status of sex workers.
81 See John Anthony “Southern Taxis Ordered to Pay Drivers Nearly $100,000 in Lost Wages, 
MBIE Says” Stuff (8 August 2018) <stuff.co.nz>.
82 Hamilton-Redmond and Clifford, above n 1, at [129].
83 At [126].
